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“Utopian in the right sense”: The Responsibility to Protect and the Logical 
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Aidan Hehir
Abstract
In this article I argue that the claims made about the efficacy of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) echo the pejorative conceptions of “utopianism” advanced by E. H. Carr and Ken 
Booth, in two ways: by virtue of RtoP’s supporter’s determination to claim “progress” in 
spite of countervailing empirical evidence, and the exaggerated importance supporters ascribe 
to institutionalization, which mistakenly conflates state support with a change in state 
behavior and interests. I argue that RtoP’s impact on the behavior of states has been, and will 
continue to be, limited and that while RtoP has garnered widespread support amongst states, 
this is due to it having been rendered largely impotent through a process of norm co-optation. 
While both Carr and Booth criticized a particular form of utopianism, I demonstrate that both 
also defended the articulation of normative prescriptions that are not immediately feasible; to 
this end, I conclude by suggesting a potential reform of the existing international legal order 
that meets Carr’s preference for normative thinking that is “utopian in the right sense”. 
INTRODUCTION
In this article I argue that the claims made about the success of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) to date and about its bright future cohere with conceptions of “utopianism” as 
advanced in particular by E. H. Carr and Ken Booth. Arguments heralding the efficacy of 
RtoP echo Carr’s and Booth’s characterizations  of utopianism in two ways: a determination 
to claim “progress” in spite of countervailing empirical evidence, and an exaggeration of the 
importance of institutionalization that mistakenly conflates state support with a change in 
state behavior and interests. 
RtoP’s efficacy is predicated on its capacity to serve as a means by which political 
and moral pressure is brought to bear on states—particularly the permanent five members of 
the Security Council (P5)—so that they take remedial action in order to avoid “social 
exclusion.”1 The strategy underpinning RtoP, therefore, seeks to alter the behavior of states 
through moral advocacy rather than legal reform, which is invariably dismissed by RtoP 
supporters as impossible to achieve. Therefore, the concept is commonly presented as the 
best, most realistic option and, ostensibly, “the only show in town for those serious about 
preventing future Kosovos and future Rwandas.”2 While RtoP has certainly become 
embedded in international political debate, I will argue that its impact on the behavior of 
states has been limited. To do this, I will analyze the “successes” routinely advanced as 
evidence of RtoP’s efficacy, which, I will demonstrate, do not equate with the empirical 
evidence relating to human rights protection globally. At the same time, I will highlight what 
I take to be an analytical bias toward preserving a narrative of “progress.”  Ironically, while 
RtoP has garnered widespread support amongst states, this is due to it having been rendered 
largely impotent through a process of norm co-optation. While RtoP has, therefore, proved 
more palatable to states than legal reform, it is palatable precisely because it does not compel 
meaningful change in state behavior. 
Given the nature of contemporary events, and specifically the increase in human 
rights violations and intrastate mass atrocity crimes, I argue that those seeking to ensure that 
the international community is consistently responsive to intrastate atrocity crimes must 
embrace the need for legal reform so as to diminish the influence of national interests on 
decisions regarding when, where, and how to respond. At present, reform may not seem 
politically possible or imminent, but this does not necessarily render the idea “utopian.” 
While both Carr and Booth criticized a particular form of utopianism, I demonstrate that both 
also defended the articulation of normative prescriptions that are not immediately feasible. I 
conclude by offering a potential reform based on these principles. 
A BALANCE BETWEEN UTOPIA AND REALITY  
Within international relations (IR) and international law, the term “utopian” has invariably 
been applied pejoratively; typically, an idea is “utopian” when the ends sought do not cohere 
with the existing characteristics, and evolutionary trajectory, of the contemporary political 
system.3 Critiques of “utopianism”—certainly within IR—often draw on Carr’s The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis. Carr critiqued utopianism characterized by aspirational propositions rather than 
empirical analysis.4 Utopians, he argued, based their arguments on so-called “facts” that were 
actually the product of their own hopes rather than scientific inquiry; as a consequence, the 
utopian “inhabits a dream world.”5 These utopians, Carr noted, tended to claim progress 
when elements of their project became institutionalized and rhetorically avowed by states. 
This was particularly evident, he suggested, with respect to those provisions of the League of 
Nations’ Covenant that enunciated lofty aims—such as the renunciation of war and the 
principle of decision-making by consensus—that did not cohere with the existing dispositions 
of states. Thus, though these ideals were institutionalized in the League’s Covenant, they did 
not change state interests or behavior, but rather were used by states as rhetorical weapons 
and thus became “bulwark[s] of the status quo.”6 
While Carr’s critique of utopian thinking is widely known, his defense of normative 
theorizing has often been overlooked. As noted by Booth, some proponents of “doctrinal 
realism” consciously ignore the nuances of Carr’s argument and his “decidedly utopian 
leanings.”7 These scholars espouse a worldview based on a presumption of systemic 
immutability and perennial power politics, and thus predict “continuity, regularity, and 
repetition.”8 This is a truncated caricature of realism, which is not reflective of Carr’s 
position, or of the strain of normative theorizing that runs through this school of thought—
particularly classical realism—more generally.9 On a closer look, one sees that Carr’s critique 
of utopianism did not in fact constitute a critique of any theory or prescription that aimed to 
limit the occurrence of war. In fact, he actually criticized those whose views were overly 
fatalistic and singularly focused on state power, and he argued that academia should be 
normative and focused on “what ought to be.”10 He advocated a “mature” methodological 
approach situated between the “naivety” of the utopian and the “sterility” of the realist, one 
that has the ability to advance prescriptions that are not, at present ‘wholly attainable’.11 
Carr’s critique was therefore of a particular form of normative theorizing; indeed, he 
characterized his own vision as utopian.12
Drawing on Carr’s analysis, Booth advocated a “utopian realism” that navigates 
between the extremes of both utopianism and realism in an effort to effect positive change.13
Though critical of doctrinal realism, Booth argued that those seeking a better world should 
not lapse into future-orientated musings that ignore the existing dispositions of states, and 
thus fail to chart a realistic means by which to achieve their ends.14 Like Carr’s critique of the 
“hollow” progress of institutionalization, Booth also cautioned against conflating states’ 
stated support for change with actual change in the behavior of states; those who uncritically 
celebrated the assurances of states, Booth argued, were engaged in “self-deception.”15 Their 
desperation to maintain the veracity of their progress narrative had in fact turned many 
advocates of change into “house trained ‘critics’ of the powerful” who, “always adjust to 
their ruler’s agendas and flatter the power which is ruling.”16
Thus, while Carr and Booth’s ideological foundations and prescriptions were quite 
different, their critiques of utopianism clearly overlap; both advocate a realistic utopianism 
and criticize doctrinal or sterile realists who dismiss all normative prescriptions. Booth’s 
utopian realism is based on an understanding of utopia where the goals sought are “freed 
from the definitional trap of having to appear immediately possible,”17 while Carr likewise 
defends the articulation of prescriptions that are not immediately attainable as being “utopian 
in the right sense.”18 Yet, both are also critical of utopianism that is characterized by 
teleological zealotry and by a determination to claim success and progress almost solely 
based on what states and their leaders promise. I argue that this understanding of utopian in 
the pejorative sense characterizes the discourse surrounding the putative success of RtoP. 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
While the post–cold war era began with widespread optimism about a greater role for the 
United Nations in the protection of human rights, a series of intrastate atrocities in the 1990s 
highlighted that the international community remained inconsistently responsive to such 
crises, in large part because of the powers vested in the P5.19 NATO’s “illegal but 
legitimate”20 intervention in Kosovo in 1999 highlighted the problem most starkly; this 
evident disjuncture between law and morality was widely lamented, and calls for reform 
abounded.21 In response, in 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) published its report The Responsibility to Protect. 
Rather than challenge the legal rights of states or call for the reform of the 
international legal architecture, ICISS sought to work within the existing system and 
explicitly rejected the idea of reform.22 Likewise, the version of RtoP endorsed at the 2005 
World Summit did not constitute a new law, as is widely accepted by RtoP’s key 
supporters.23 RtoP’s efficacy, therefore, is not predicated on it having created either a new 
legal obligation for states, or a new means by which international institutions are mandated to 
authorize the international response to intrastate crises, or censure states for committing 
intrastate mass atrocities. Rather, the efficacy of RtoP is predicated on its “Three Pillars” 
(protection, assistance, and timely response) operating simultaneously to alter the behavior 
and disposition of states by creating a new normative framework within which states consider 
how to act appropriately.
As RtoP seeks to change the disposition of states through force of argument rather 
than legal censure or compulsion, any purported efficacy is premised on a particular 
understanding of the role and power of norms.24 By virtue of constituting a norm, RtoP 
ostensibly makes it difficult to engage in, or legitimize, certain behavior.25 Advocates argue 
that state affirmations of RtoP constitute “speech acts”26 that lead to a process of what some 
have called “rhetorical entrapment”27 whereby the routine invocation of RtoP by states limits 
their capacity and willingness to ignore looming or actual mass atrocities internally or 
elsewhere. Intrastate mass atrocity crimes have clearly been perpetrated since 2005, but 
proponents of RtoP note that research on norms demonstrates that norm violations do not in 
themselves constitute evidence that a norm is no longer operable, nor does contestation 
surrounding the meaning of a norm.28 Rather, proponents argue that having now established 
itself as a norm, RtoP is ostensibly poised to grow in influence, while overcoming occasional 
lapses in its implementation. 
Any hypothetical legal reform that would alter the means by which the international 
community regulates compliance with human rights law and authorizes remedial measures is 
invariably deemed impossible and/or undesirable.29 The more realistic and viable strategy, so 
the logic goes, is to work with the existing system and its laws.30 Thus, at its core RtoP has a 
conceptual distinction between what is deemed realistic, namely RtoP, and what is seen as 
essentially utopian, namely reform of the existing system.
 
UTOPIANISM AND RTOP
The arguments of those making the case for RtoP’s success and transformative potential 
cohere with Carr and Booth’s characterization of pejorative utopianism in two ways: a 
determination to claim progress in spite of countervailing empirical evidence, and an 
exaggeration of the importance of a form of institutionalization that mistakenly conflates state 
support with a change in state behavior and interests. 
“Progress” and Evidence 
While proponents of RtoP do not laud it as a silver bullet, central to the narrative heralding its 
efficacy are claims regarding its progress to date. RtoP has, its supporters claim, made 
“tremendous progress,”31 and “begun to change the world”32 by virtue of exercising a definite 
and growing influence on the behavior of states. Central to the rationale underpinning RtoP is 
the principle that it “applies everywhere, all the time” and not only after mass atrocities 
occur.33 Indeed, RtoP’s primary function, proponents have increasingly argued, is as a means 
to prevent the occurrence of mass atrocities.34 This has led to a plethora of reports, books, and 
articles advancing prescriptions on how to tackle the root causes of mass atrocities and 
identify triggers that can lead to them.35 Thus, while RtoP explicitly targets the four crimes in 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, it is not limited to situations where these crimes 
have occurred; the preventative element necessitates eliminating lower-level human rights 
abuses that are known to lead to the occurrence of one or more of the four crimes. A recent 
Tweet from Alex Bellamy is representative of this logic: “Preventing atrocity crimes starts 
with ending all forms of discrimination.”36
Yet, since 2014 a series of reports from a wide array of UN bodies, human rights 
organizations, and think tanks—such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Crisis Group, Freedom House, the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, and the International Committee of the Red Cross—have all 
recorded a dramatic increase in crimes against humanity, genocide/politicide, and state 
oppression, while noting a concomitant growing unwillingness on the part of the international 
community to respond in a coordinated, consistent, and effective way.37 Amnesty 
International’s 2016 report declared the present situation to be the “nadir” in post–World War 
II human rights protection.38 Likewise, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted in his 2016 
report on RtoP that the international community had “fallen woefully short” in protecting 
human rights, and that the “frequency and scale of atrocity crimes have increased.”39 
These negative trends are exemplified by the steady deterioration of the crisis in 
Syria, where bitter divisions among the P5 have rendered them incapable of implementing a 
coordinated remedial strategy—which, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, has cost hundreds of thousands of lives.40 Russia and China have repeatedly vetoed 
draft resolutions seeking to impose modest sanctions on Assad’s regime, prompting Ban Ki-
moon to declare that the Security Council had “too often failed to live up to its global 
responsibility.”41 In addition to Syria, since 2014 intrastate crises have erupted or escalated in 
Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Israel, 
Kenya, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen.42 The link 
between civil war, systemic state-sponsored human rights violations, and the four crimes 
within RtoP’s purview is widely recognized; as noted by the Group of Friends of RtoP, 
“Widespread and systematic abuses or violations of human rights often serve as early 
warning signs of potential genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and/or crimes against 
humanity.”43 The increase in state oppression, the sharp deterioration in global respect for 
human rights, and the growing unwillingness and/or inability on the part of UN member 
states to respond in a timely, consistent, and effective manner are trends that do not meet the 
tenets of a normative preventative culture. This suggests that the narrative heralding the 
“progress” made by RtoP echoes Carr’s depiction of the utopian’s propensity to ignore facts 
in favor of an account of progress which, ‘…was as different from anything they saw around 
them as gold from lead’.44 
Institutionalization 
Central to RtoP’s narrative of success and progress is the fact that since its recognition in 
2005 it has garnered widespread state support. RtoP has been routinely affirmed, and very 
rarely unequivocally disavowed, by states at the General Assembly debates on RtoP held 
annually since 2009.45 Additionally, fifty-six states have now appointed an “RtoP Focal 
Point”, forty-nine states (and the European Union) have joined the Group of Friends of the 
Responsibility to Protect, and the Security Council has invoked RtoP in fifty-three 
resolutions; this is regularly offered as evidence of RtoP’s growing power.46 
The claim—routinely made by proponents of RtoP—that consensus and widespread 
rhetorical invocation constitute grounds for determining the existence of a norm, is reflected 
in the broader literature on norms.47 Yet, while RtoP may well meet the general criteria for 
recognition as a norm, this does not necessarily mean it has had, or will have, a positive 
impact on the behavior of states. That a norm exists does not necessarily constitute a value 
judgement about its effectiveness, but rather simply establishes that this particular 
term/phrase/idea commands a degree of consensus and is widely used.48 Proponents of 
RtoP’s efficacy, however, often advance an understanding of norms that obscures the 
spectrum of norm typology, variations in norm efficacy, the complex process by which norms 
are diffused and implemented, and the influence of power asymmetries on the evolution of 
norms.49 Many of those who advance the success/progress narrative thus engage in a 
superficial reading of RtoP’s evolution. That it has become a norm and that this norm is 
widely employed is taken as sufficient grounds upon which to base the “progress” claims. In 
fact, the emergence and later proliferation of a norm need not necessarily constitute a positive 
development, as is noted below with respect to the Security Council’s increased use of RtoP. 
   Norms evidence divergent efficacy and a range of characteristics. A particularly 
important distinction exists between “regulative” and “constitutive” norms, with the latter 
deemed to create new interests rather than just outline appropriate behavior.50 Furthermore, 
rather than changing existing state interests, a norm can be co-opted, namely applied to 
legitimize action to further preexisting interests.51 Therefore, while the goals behind the 
emergence of a norm may be laudable, the establishment of that norm does not necessarily 
mean it will have the intended positive influences on state behavior; in fact, the emergence of 
a norm may well have a negative impact if it is sufficiently vague so as to be vulnerable to 
strategic, and indeed mendacious, manipulation.52 
RtoP certainly constitutes a vague norm; in practice, while states are evidently keen to 
affirm their commitment to it, there are significant differences among states as to what it 
actually is. As Jennifer Welsh accepts, “It cannot be assumed that the meaning of a norm 
such as RtoP is stable, or that it signifies the same thing to all actors post-
institutionalization.”53 While many of those who believe in RtoP’s transformative potential 
do acknowledge the limitations of norms,54 the efficacy of RtoP is predicated on its 
progressive evolution, the idea being that while RtoP may not as yet exercise sufficiently 
powerful leverage against states, it will do so in the future.55 Yet the evolutionary trajectory 
of the RtoP norm to date suggests otherwise. 
Security Council resolutions that refer to RtoP evidence a very clear and arguably 
retrogressive trend. Of the fifty-three resolutions passed that refer to RtoP, only five even 
acknowledge the existence of Pillar III, the external responsibility of the international 
community. The rest refer to RtoP only in the context of the host state’s responsibility. This 
indicates, therefore, that the Security Council employs RtoP exclusively to affirm that the 
responsibility for resolving a particular crisis is not theirs, but rather that of the host state. 
RtoP is thus being used as a means by which the Security Council evades responsibility. RtoP 
was not established to better enable the Security Council to justify their own inaction by 
deflecting responsibility on to others, and thus this manifestation of RtoP’s increased usage in 
international discourse actually constitutes a negative development in the norm’s evolution. 
Leaving the Security Council aside for a moment, the affirmation of RtoP by 
individual states has two characteristics that should also temper the conflation of increased 
invocation with progress. First, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document have been interpreted by a bloc of predominantly developing world states to 
reiterate the principles of sovereign inviolability and sovereign equality, and to enhance the 
primacy of the state in protecting its citizens and resolving intrastate crises. These states have, 
as Welsh notes, employed RtoP so as to preserve “legal egalitarianism”; that is, to enhance 
the power of the state at the expense of the external regulation of compliance with 
international human rights law.56 Second, these states use the concept to bolster their view 
that the interventionist role of the international community should be operationalized only 
with state consent; in this way, RtoP is invoked only in the context of Pillars I and II and the 
“responsibility to prevent.”57 This restriction of the meaning of RtoP explains the growing 
consensus and is not necessarily illustrative of a new disposition among previously 
oppressive states. For many states, therefore, these affirmations of RtoP appear to be strategic 
signals sent to gain social capital at the UN and to encourage the norm to evolve in a way that 
supports a preexisting preference for sovereign inviolability.58 
The actual implementation of a constitutive global norm depends on how it is 
incorporated into the ideational, material, and institutional structures within each state. If 
these structures are not altered, then the norm cannot be said to have transitioned from being 
a regulative norm into an embedded constitutive norm.59 Expressing rhetorical support for 
RtoP does not necessitate a change in the state’s “organizational culture,” which norm 
scholars identify as crucial to the efficacy of a norm.60 Thus, in practice, states that have 
expressed a commitment to RtoP have not always institutionalized this commitment; in fact, 
many states have agreed to endorse the principle precisely because it was not viewed as 
transformational in any way.61 
As evidence of the above, states such as Bahrain and Sudan, which routinely and 
actively engage in systematic human rights violations, have expressed their commitment to 
RtoP.62 Additionally, the lack of any membership criteria and the self-regulation of 
compliance have meant that certain states with very poor human rights records—such as 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Qatar—have joined the RtoP Focal Points 
group while continuing to engage in systemic oppression domestically.  
The above has shown that the RtoP norm has suffered cooptation.63 Its frequent 
invocation is not a consequence of RtoP having changed the behavior of states but rather a 
function of its malleability. Thus we see that both the lack of hard evidence supporting 
RtoP’s impact and the conflation of institutionalization with changes to states’ interests 
conforms neatly to both Carr’s and Booth’s critiques of utopianism. RtoP is not, of course, 
the first phrase or norm to be cynically invoked; indeed, the long history of norm cooptation 
should temper the enthusiasm surrounding the perceived significance of RtoP’s increased 
invocation.64 
THE LOGICAL NECESSITY OF REFORM
History shows that states will develop an interest in violating a norm if they perceive that it is 
necessary to do so in order to realize more pressing interests.65 The extent to which states 
violate a norm or law is, of course, dependent on the nature of the punitive redress they face 
for so doing; preventing and/or halting mass atrocity crimes, therefore, necessitates engaging 
with the logic behind both the decision to commit such acts and the decision-making calculus 
faced by those called upon to react to such acts committed outside their territory. 
The decision to commit mass atrocities is invariably a function of a particular set of 
triggering factors whereby the aggressors perceive that their status, or very existence, is 
threatened; thus, though the costs associated with committing these crimes may be great, the 
costs of inaction are considered to be greater.66 The decision to engage in mass atrocities is, 
therefore, always rational—though obviously immoral—in the sense that it stems from a 
cost/benefit calculation; authorities who order mass atrocities do not do so inadvertently, but 
rather on the presumption that, on balance, these acts will strengthen their position.67  
Because it is a regulative norm, and not a law, RtoP is dependent on the power of 
shaming to deter or compel behavior.68 However, without having meaningfully internalized 
RtoP, and with Pillar III essentially dormant,69 states most likely to engage in mass 
atrocities—those with histories of repressive rule and an ambivalence toward international 
opinion—are highly unlikely to view shaming as a sufficiently powerful countervailing 
disincentive, especially if they (correctly or not) perceive their very existence to be 
threatened. 
RtoP is, therefore, ineffective in precisely those cases where it is needed most; so long 
as support for RtoP is exclusively for Pillars I and II, the concept will be impotent in cases 
where engaging in mass atrocity crimes is perceived of as a matter of existential gravity, as is 
usually the case.70 The absence of support for Pillar III undermines the idea that RtoP is 
making progress, as it is this aspect of RtoP alone that can potentially change the cost/benefit 
calculations of states likely to engage in intrastate atrocities. 
The logic of interests and of a cost/benefit calculation also applies to those called 
upon to prevent or halt mass atrocities; the external dimension of RtoP is oriented toward the 
delineation of a positive duty that by definition competes with other norms and imperatives.71 
History amply demonstrates that states will not take action to prevent or halt mass atrocities 
in another state if the costs associated with such action—including financial cost, loss of life, 
trade relations with the oppressor state, hostility amongst domestic publics toward 
intervention, the nature of the oppressor state’s allies, and domestic support for the oppressor 
regime—are too high.72 In recent years Western states—invariably the drivers of 
intervention—have become ever more risk-averse.73 So long as those called upon to prevent 
or halt mass atrocity crimes have a right to act rather than an obligation, the decision to act 
will by definition stem from such calculations; and as RtoP does not significantly raise the 
costs of inaction, the calculation is naturally heavily tipped toward not taking inherently 
costly action. It is not that states seek at all times to avoid taking action that incurs costs, but 
rather that the determining factor is the balance between the perceived importance of the 
action and the likely costs associated with it.  The efficacy of the RtoP norm is, therefore, 
prey to the more general cost/benefit analysis that determines state behavior in a system with 
weak, highly politicized legal bodies.74 
An analysis of the nature of the problem that impelled the emergence of RtoP—and 
the fate of the concept since its recognition in 2005—highlights the need to change the 
existing cost/benefit calculations of states through legal reform. In terms of those states 
contemplating engaging in mass atrocities, more consistent and automatic punishments for 
committing such acts would naturally raise the cost of so doing to a more prohibitively high 
level. Likewise, more consistent and effective international responses to looming or actual 
mass atrocities require actors with defined duties to respond, as well as punishments for 
dereliction of those duties. Given that the Security Council was purposely designed to ensure 
that the power and interests of the Great Powers have institutional expression, it is manifestly 
not capable of imparting consistent, objective, and ultimately effective punishment.75 
“Utopian in the Right Sense”?  
Initiating reform is, of course, a huge challenge. Many scholars, however, have advanced 
ideas on how to change the existing system;76 and while each idea cannot be said to have 
achieved the balance between utopianism and fatalism advocated by Carr and Booth (and 
indeed others77), they all align with the two principles underlying those thinkers’ 
perspectives: that positive change cannot occur if the existing system remains unaltered, and 
that advancing proposals for a reformed system that are not likely to be accepted at the 
moment does not render them utopian in the pejorative sense.78 
The limitations of international law, specifically with respect to law enforcement, 
have long been noted and lamented.79 As Hans Kelsen argued, the UN system established in 
1945 is “primitive” precisely because it ensures that political interests determine how and 
when the law is enforced.80 International law, like all law, is inherently political, and those 
who have called for legal reform that diminishes the influence of politics on law enforcement 
have generally eschewed overly-ambitious prescriptions that seek to eliminate politics from 
law altogether, preferring incremental reform that, though difficult to implement, is not 
impossible to achieve. Indicatively, Kelsen argued that to move the international legal order 
beyond its primitive stage, greater authority has to be delegated to trans-state institutions. 
And while he accepted this was inherently difficult, it was, he argued, “not a logical 
impossibility.”81 
Carr’s own emphasis on the importance of law on the evolution toward a less violent 
world, both domestically and internationally, align with this preference for legal change.82 
Carr noted, however, that the mere existence of law is insufficient; law’s efficacy demands 
“effective machinery,” namely, institutions designed both to objectively regulate compliance 
with the law and ultimately, when necessary, punish violations.83 There is, he argued, a 
fundamental need for a “combination of consent and coercion” to underpin any effective 
legal order.84 At the international level, this requires, he argued, an institution with a global 
remit and coercive capacity. Yet, in keeping with his preference for being “utopian in the 
right sense,” Carr advocated a progressive evolution rather than what he called “muddle 
headed plans” for a global governance regime.85 Booth likewise rejected expansive plans for 
global governance, advocating instead “reformist steps” toward both the diffusion of 
decision-making on certain issues to communities below the level of the state, and the 
transfer of authority on other matters of global importance to “global functional 
organisations” above the state.86
Carr and Booth’s prescriptions thus share core similarities: a disinclination to accept 
that the lawless power politics of the state system is immutable; a belief that normative 
prescriptions must be advanced lest we lapse into sterility; a conviction that prescriptions 
need not be immediately feasible, but also should not be hopelessly idealistic; and, ultimately, 
that progressive change requires diminishing the power of states through the delegation of 
authority to bodies above—and in Booth’s case also below—states. How might such 
guidelines be applied to the prevention and cessation of intrastate mass atrocities? Naturally, 
outlining a detailed plan is beyond the scope of this article, but it is possible, I believe, to 
determine the principles, and indeed the contours, of a proposal that is “utopian in the right 
sense.” 
In terms of principles, if RtoP has failed because it has not significantly altered the 
cost/benefit analysis of those states most likely to engage in mass atrocity crimes, then any 
more useful prescription must seek to redress this shortcoming by advancing a form of 
censure that states will perceive as significant. Likewise, the means by which a state incurs 
such censure must involve the delegation of authority to a nonstate body. It must be 
remembered that there are currently means by which intrastate mass atrocity crimes can be 
prevented and halted, but that they are in practice flawed because they are authorized by an 
inherently political state-based body, namely the Security Council. 
Mindful of Carr and Booth’s warnings regarding overly ambitious plans, any 
prescription based on these principles should not seek to advocate a theoretically robust but 
hopelessly unfeasible set of reforms. Rather, the goal should be to design a prescription that, 
though ambitious, seeks to incrementally establish the permissibility of a particular modus 
operandi that can serve as a basis upon which more developed structures can be built at a 
later date. 
Having established these principles, the form of censure and the nature of the body 
delegated to impose it require clarification. Before suggesting one possible reform, it is 
important to note that there are many potential reforms that can be advanced on the basis of 
these underlying principles. What follows, then, is not offered as the only viable means by 
which to initiate the process. Indeed, this idea may be flawed in other ways. However, unless 
we accept that the system is immutable—and thus reject the analysis presented by Carr, 
Booth, and others—it must be possible to determine some means by which to catalyze 
incremental change. This can only happen if sterility and fatalism are rejected and people are 
willing to articulate an array of proposals. In other words, identifying a realistic means by 
which to initiate reform cannot happen if the very idea of reform is deemed impossible.   
One prescription based on these principles—and navigating the path advocated by 
Carr and Booth—would be to argue for a change to Article 6 of the UN Charter, which states 
that “a Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles 
contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” This provision establishes that 
UN membership is not a right, and thus can be revoked if a state repeatedly acts against the 
principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter. The problem with this provision, however, is 
that expulsion requires, first, a recommendation from the Security Council and, second, the 
support of the General Assembly. To date, Article 6 has never been triggered. 
If this article were changed to enable a body other than the Security Council to make a 
recommendation to the General Assembly, however, then this provision would have 
considerably more teeth. Relating this back to the issue of intrastate mass atrocity crimes, if 
the authority to propose expulsion of a member state were delegated to the UN secretary-
general, then it would be much more likely that Article 6 could be triggered. To make such a 
change less controversial, Article 6 could be interpreted as providing for suspension of 
membership—as per Article 5 of the Charter—rather than outright expulsion; thus a state 
could have its membership suspended for a year with the possibility of readmission if the 
original violations had ceased. 
The specter of suspension/expulsion authorized by an impartial body on the basis of 
intrastate mass atrocity crimes would undoubtedly enter the calculus of states, given that UN 
membership is clearly something they value. No state has ever permanently withdrawn from 
the UN; Indonesia did leave in January 1965, but its self-imposed isolation only lasted until 
September 1966, when it asked to be readmitted. In 1974, apartheid South Africa was 
expelled from the General Assembly, though not officially from the UN itself, as Article 6 
was not invoked due to the Security Council’s refusal to support expulsion; and thereafter the 
South African government repeatedly sought to have the decision revoked. Additionally, 
upon declaring independence, states are always strikingly eager to join the world 
organization. 
The benefits of such a reform are that it would, albeit minimally, transfer some power 
to the Secretariat, and thus constitute a tentative step toward the idea of transferring the 
authority to censure states to a nonstate body. Of course, this would not be a silver bullet; 
some states may calculate that in certain situations UN membership is a price worth paying. 
Likewise, there is no guarantee that a recommendation from the secretary-general would be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. Additionally, a high degree of 
prudence would need to be exercised by the secretary-general; proposing the expulsion of one 
of the P5 would naturally trigger a constitutional crisis for the UN. Such prudence would, 
however, by definition perpetuate a degree of selectivity. Additionally, and more obviously, 
such a change would—like all UN reforms—require the consent of the P5, and their appetite 
for reform has always been, and remains, minimal. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting four aspects of this proposal that increase its appeal 
when compared with other suggested reforms. First, this change would not in any way 
diminish the P5’s core powers, namely, their veto and their monopoly over the authorization 
of the use of force. Second, that states can be suspended or expelled from the UN is already 
an established legal principle. Third, “encouraging respect for human rights” is noted in 
Chapter I of the Charter as one of the UN’s principles, and Security Council practice since 
the end of the cold war has routinely established that intrastate mass atrocities are recognized 
as a violation of the UN’s principles. Thus, linking the permissibility of suspension or 
expulsion and the impermissibility of perpetrating intrastate mass atrocity crimes constitutes 
a union of existing principles rather than a new revolutionary one. Fourth, any fear that such 
reform would imbue the UN secretary-general with too much power could be mitigated by 
providing that his or her recommendation would require, for example, the support of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights and a selection of members from the human rights 
treaty bodies. In addition, the recommendation would, as per Article 6, also require the assent 
of the General Assembly, and states would therefore continue to have a role in the process.
While these facts make the proposal more likely to be accepted than many proposals 
that more overtly challenge the P5 and established principles, there is of course no doubt that 
objections would be raised, particularly by the P5. Yet, as both Carr and Booth argue, the 
very point of normative thinking is to advance prescriptions that may not as yet be politically 
possible, but are also not inherently impossible to achieve. As such, once we accept the 
principle that meaningful proposals for reform challenge the status quo, it is simply stating 
the obvious to argue that the reforms disturb the existing order and may not be universally 
welcomed. In discussing the need for international regulatory bodies, Carr argued that these 
“elegant superstructures” could only be built incrementally after “some progress has been 
made in digging the foundations.”87 By virtue of dismissing the need for reform and legal 
change, RtoP has had little impact on developing these essential foundations. Advancing 
prescriptions that rebrand existing policies and procedures but do not in any way alter the 
status quo may result in acquiescence but not in actual change.  And by definition not 
changing a flawed system does not improve the situation, regardless of how enthusiastically 
the existing powerholders greet the hollow proposals. 
CONCLUSION
RtoP ostensibly works because it is a norm that increasingly frames how states respond to 
looming or actual mass atrocities; and by virtue of being a norm, as opposed to a proposal for 
legal or institutional change, it is more palatable to states. In this article I have argued that 
RtoP’s goals are not necessarily pejoratively utopian, but the means advocated are. Expecting 
revolutionary change in the behavior of states—a change that has no precedent in human 
history—while advocating the maintenance of the systemic status quo renders the project 
akin to the utopianism criticized by Carr and Booth. 
RtoP’s efficacy is “ultimately . . . all about political will,”88 and thus premised on the 
notion that states will be influenced by the arguments advanced by “good people”89 who 
encourage them to behave better. Yet, as Carr noted, the League of Nations floundered 
because it, too, was premised on the idea that states would be influenced by “world public 
opinion.”90 Claims regarding RtoP’s progress can only be sustained by minimizing the 
importance of, or completely ignoring, countervailing empirical evidence and exaggerating 
the importance of rhetorical support for RtoP among states.  
While RtoP is palatable to states, this palatability is a function of the fact that states 
can express support for RtoP without having to implement meaningful change in their 
behavior. The process by which RtoP has come to be a norm routinely avowed by states but 
only, crucially, in a particular way, fits a broader pattern whereby certain norms are 
manipulated to further selfish ends.91 In practice, the evidence overwhelmingly points 
towards a sharp and continuing degeneration in global respect for human rights and an 
increase in mass atrocity crimes. RtoP’s continued affirmation of the systemic status quo is 
therefore untenable. The quest to end mass atrocity crimes requires as a logical necessity 
proposals for legal and institutional reform that compels rather than merely encourages states 
to change their behavior. This necessitates the articulation of prescriptions for legal reform 
that may well be unlikely to occur at present or soon, but that are ultimately more consistent 
with the underlying logic of the goals sought. 
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